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                                               Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess the nexus between intelligence (or human capital) and 
statistical capacity in developing countries. The line of inquiry is motivated essentially by: (i) 
the scarce literature devoted to elucidating poor statistics in developing countries and (ii) an 
evolving stream of literature on knowledge economy. We have established a positive 
association between intelligence quotient (IQ) and statistical capacity. The relationship is: (i) 
consistent with the employment of alternative specifications based on varying conditioning 
information sets and (ii) robust to the control of outliers.  Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Incorrect national statistics negatively bears on government effectiveness (Kodila-Tedika, 
2014a) and potentially creates debates in policy circles. This debate which has been 
articulated with fundamental growth issues in Africa, coincided with the publication of some 
notable works on data revision, inter alia: Jerven (2013a), Devarajan (2013), Harttgen, Klasen 
and Vollmer (2013). While Jerven (2013b) has clearly outlined the issues in a new book, 
Young (2012) has established that some indicators on Africa’s development are growing 
about 4 times what is indicated by international datasets. This has motivated a growing stream 
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of literature on the subject, notably a recent book premised on whether Africa’s recent growth 
resurgence is a reality or a myth (Fosu, 2015ab). 
 In light of the above, it is important to elucidate why good statistics may be present in 
some countries and not others. To the best of our knowledge, very little has been covered on 
this stream of literature, essentially owing to the relatively new stream of debate. As far as we 
have reviewed, only Kodila-Tedika (2013) has attempted to elucidate this concern of 
statistical quality in African countries. The present line of inquiry aims to extend this stream 
of the literature from a human capital angle, notably: on the role of intelligence or intelligence 
quotient (IO) in statistical capacity.  
 The positioning of the line of inquiry on human capital aligns well with an evolving 
stream of African development literature, articulating the imperative for African countries to 
catch-up with the rest of the world by enhancing their transition from product-based 
economies to knowledge-based economies (Anyanwu, 2012; Asongu, 2014a; Oluwatobi et 
al., 2014; Andrés et al., 2014;  Asongu, 2015a)
1
.  
Our theoretical hypothesis is founded on the following arguments. Indeed, educated 
persons tend to be good and well informed citizens (Reynal-Querol and Besley, 2011;Besley 
et al., 2011). A high degree of citizenship and information should include being more reliable 
and indebted (Botero et al., 2012). Lynn et al. (2007) and Lynn and Milk (2007) have shown 
that the IQ is highly correlated with education. Accordingly, people with high IQs can easily 
use their education for various purposes. Within the framework of this line of inquiry, 
societies enjoying relatively high IQ should be associated with a higher demand for accurate 
information, collected as statistics. This theoretical postulation broadly aligns with 
recommendations for better statistics from Young (2012) and Henderson et al. (2012). Based 
                                                          
1
It is important to note that these recommendations have been emphasised based on the knowledge that, it is 
more feasible for African countries to engage in reverse engineering because their current technologies are more 
imitative and adaptive in nature (Asongu, 2014b, 2015b, p. 578; Tchamyou, 2014; Asongu, 2014c).  
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on the above theoretical postulations, our testable hypothesis is as follows: on average, 
countries with high IQ present better statistics, relative to their low IQ counterparts.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. Empirical results are presented Section 3 while Section 4 concludes with 
implications.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
The indicator of the Bulletin Board on Statistical Capacity (BBSC), developed by the 
Development Data Group of the World Bank, which focuses on improving the monitoring and 
measuring of statistical capacity of the International Development Association (IDA) 
countries in close collaboration with users and countries. The database embodies information 
from a plethora of aspects of national statistical systems and entails a country-level statistical 
capacity indicator which is based on a set of criteria that are consistent with international 
recommendations. 
The BBSC discloses information on various dimensions of national statistical systems of 
developing nations, embodying a statistical capacity indicator at the country-level. This 
indicator examines the capacity of statistical systems with the help of a diagnostic framework 
which entails three investigative areas, notably: data sources; methodology and periodicity 
and timeliness (institutional framework is excluded). The rating ranges from 0 to 100, with 
higher values denoting better capacity. 
The data on intelligence is from Meisenberg and Lynn (2011) and its previous versions can be 
found in Lynn and Vanhanen (2002, 2006). This dataset is a compilation of hundreds of 
average national IQ tests observed over the 20
th
 and the 21
st
 centuries using best practice 
methods. Average IQ is a measure of general-purpose human capital as well as a measure of 
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nation's labor quality (Hanushek & Kimko, 2000; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008; Jones & 
Schneider, 2006).  
 The choice of the statistical indicator and intelligence measurement are broadly 
consistent with recent economic development and intelligence literature (Weede & Kämpf, 
2002; Jones & Schneider, 2006; Ram, 2007; Potrafke, 2012; Kodila-Tedika & Kanyama-
Kalonda, 2014;  Kodila-Tedika, 2014b; Rindermann et al., 2014; Kodila-Tedika & Mustacu, 
2014; Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe, 2014; Kodila-Tedika and Asongu, 2015ab). It is 
interesting to note that data from Hanushek on the one hand and from Lynn and Vanhanen on 
the other hand are continuously being improved (Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011; 2012).  
 In accordance with recent literature on statistical capacity (Kodila-Tedika, 2013, 
2014a), we control for GDP per capita, trade openness (openness), state fragility, ethnic 
fractionalization and government effectiveness. While data on GDP per capita and trade is 
sourced from Pen World Tables, ethnic fractionalization is from Alesina et al. (2003). The 
state fragility variable is from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2011) based on the 
World Bank classification while the government effectiveness measurement is provided by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010). The expected signs of the control variables are engaged concurrently 
with the discussion of empirical results.  
 Consistent with recent human capital or intelligence (Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 
2015ab) and development (Asongu, 2013) literature, the specification in Eq. (1) below 
assesses the correlation between human capital and statistical capacity.  
iiii CHCSC   321                                                                     (1) 
Where: iSC ( iHC ) represents a Statistical capacity (Human Capital) indicator for country i , 
1  is a constant, C  is the vector of control variables, and i  the error term. HC  is the Human 
Capital variable while C entails: GDP per capita, trade openness (openness), state fragility, 
ethnic fractionalization and government effectiveness. In harmony with the engaged human 
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capital literature, the objective of Eq. (1) is to estimate if intelligence affects statistical 
capacity by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) using standard errors that are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
3. Empirical results 
The first Column shows univariate regressions confirms the expected positive correlation 
between intelligence and Statistical Capacity. Hence, intelligence is positively correlated with 
Statistical Capacity. Columns 2 to Column 7 assess the relationship conditional on other 
covariates (control variables). From the results, the positive correlation is broadly confirmed 
across specifications in terms of the significance of the estimated human capital (or 
intelligence) coefficient. Accordingly, the estimated coefficients varies between 0.8 and 0.3 
and the degree of adjustment (or explanatory power) of estimated coefficients also varies 
between 26.5 % and 59.3%. It is logical to expect an increasing R² with more control 
variables into the specifications. Hence, we could infer from the baseline estimations that 
countries with high IQ are associated with higher degrees of Statistical Capacity. 
Table 1. Main results 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IWLS 
Intelligence Quotient(IQ) 0.800*** 0.530*** 0.572*** 0.430*** 0.515*** 0.420** 0.262* 
 
(0.115) (0.112) (0.134) (0.160) (0.166) (0.183) (0.144) 
Fragile 
 
-17.783*** -17.207*** -9.504** -9.552** -9.465** -14.701*** 
  
(3.595) (3.734) (4.344) (4.518) (4.476) (3.224) 
Fragmentation  
  
3.654 -0.760 -0.813 -0.482 2.503 
   
(5.258) (4.530) (4.714) (4.782) (4.083) 
Governmenteffectiveness 
   
5.446** 4.824** 3.345 1.539 
    
(2.527) (2.374) (2.806) (2.299) 
Openess 
    
-0.046* -0.049** -0.048* 
     
(0.025) (0.024) (0.028) 
GDP per capita (log) 
     
2.483 4.492** 
      
(2.077) (1.773) 
Constant 3.746 29.901*** 24.485* 40.599*** 37.697** 24.393 19.474 
 
(9.703) (9.375) (12.729) (14.722) (15.038) (18.674) (15.027) 
Observations 115 110 107 91 90 90 90 
R² 0.265 0.469 0.461 0.502 0.530 0.539 0.593 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; ( ) : standard errors in parentheses. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. IWLS: Iterated Reweighted Least Squares. Log: logarithm;  
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 Given that the estimations by the OLS technique may be weak in the presence of 
outliers, we verify the robustness of corresponding estimates by employing an estimation 
technique that controls for the presence of such outliers. For this purpose of robustness we use 
Iteratively weighted least squares (IWLS). The process of robustness checks is consistent with 
Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015c) in the intelligence literature. The findings presented in the 
last column are consistent in sign and significance with OLS results, though with a relatively 
lower magnitude. The corresponding lower magnitude implies that outliers influence the 
investigated nexus between statistical capacity and intelligence. Hence, further justify the 
engaged robustness check.  
 Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. (i) State fragility 
should intuitively be negatively related with the ability of governments to collect good data 
because some regions in a given country may be affected by political strife, civil conflicts and 
wars, hence, rendering data collection very difficult. (ii) Government effectiveness has been 
documented to be positively associated with statistical capacity (Kodila-Tedika, 2014a).  (iii) 
Trade openness may decrease the ability to collect good data in inherently corrupt developing 
countries because underlying trading activities are very likely to be associated with 
misinvoicing, bribery and unfair lobbying. (iv) The positive nexus of the dependent variable 
with GDP per capita essentially builds on the intuition that, wealthier countries are endowed 
with more financial resources for good data collection, relative to their less-wealthy 
counterparts.  
 
4. Concluding implications  
The purpose of this note has been to assess the nexus between intelligence or human capital 
and a nation’s statistical capacity. The line of inquiry has been essentially motivated by: (i) 
the scarce literature devoted to elucidating availability of poor statistics in developing 
countries and (ii) an evolving literature on knowledge economy. We have established a 
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positive association between intelligence quotient (IQ) and statistical capacity. The 
relationship is: (i) consistent with the employment of alternative specifications based on 
varying conditioning information sets and (ii) robust to the control of outliers.   
 The above findings imply that as average levels of IQ in developing countries 
increase, we should expect to see countries revising their national statistics substantially. This 
has been the recent experiences of Nigeria and Kenya in Africa. Given the leading roles of 
these countries on the continent in education, innovation and information and communication 
technology (ICT) (Tchamyou, 2014), the intuition for associating the higher IQs with better 
statistical capacity is sound. This is essentially because the highlighted variables are three of 
the four dimensions of the World Bank’s knowledge economy index: the fourth being, 
‘economic incentives and institutional regime’. Accordingly, for better statistics to be 
collected, broad-based ICTs are essential to facilitate exchanges and accuracies between the 
data collector and data provider (institutions and civil societies). Moreover, with improvement 
in the levels of education, more skilled researchers would be available to refine and improve 
techniques of data collection, simulation, aggregation and computation, inter alia.  
Future lines of inquiry devoted to improving the extant literature on the subject could 
focus on understanding: (i) the channels via which the IQ improves statistical capacity and (ii) 
which dimensions of knowledge economy drive the IQ on the one hand and a nation’s 
statistical capacity, on the other hand.  
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